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ANALYSIS
Becoming “Legal” through “Illegal” Procedures: The Precarious Status of 
Migrant Workers in Russia
By Bhavna Davé, London
Abstract
Russia’s complex laws and elaborate procedures governing the status of migrant workers and a highly inade-
quate mechanism for their implementation push migrants to rely on numerous ”intermediaries” who dom-
inate the shadow economy of migration on the basis of their close connections with officials. The path to 
becoming “legal” require migrants to resort to a variety of semi-legal or outright illegal (“corrupt”) trans-
actions through the intermediaries in order to “get things done.” Thus the laws and the informal or shadow 
mechanisms of their implementation, which have emerged to aid a “legalization” of migrant workers, thrive 
on keeping a sizable proportion of them in a quasi-legal status, continuously facing the threat of illegaliza-
tion, criminalization and deportation.
Chaotic Policy, Poor Implementation
Despite being the second largest destination for migrants 
after the USA, Russia lacks a concerted policy on migra-
tion. Noted migration scholar Sergei Abashin has 
described the migration policy of Russia as “chaotic 
and unaccountable.”1 Civil rights activist Svetlana Gan-
nushkina who heads grazhdanskoe sodeistvie sees it as 
directionless.2 Sociologist Vladimir Malakhov describes 
it as lacking a rationale or economic logic, with a weak 
and inefficient mechanism for execution, which creates 
propitious settings for corruption to thrive.3
The Concept of the State Migration Policy of the 
Russian Federation, issued in June 2012 by Putin defined 
the broad trajectories and directions of the migration 
policy.4 It acknowledged Russia’s growing need for 
migrant labor and its low migration attracting poten-
tial in comparison with other states and called for the 
need to improve the legal-regulatory base and living and 
working conditions for migrants.5 Yet numerous laws 
and amendments passed since go against the directions 
outlined in the Concept. “The right hand signs one doc-
ument and the left hand another,” commented Gannush-
kina on the lack of coordination between the Migration 
Concept and subsequent laws.
1 <http://jarayon.com/ru/index.php/component/k2/item/711-
sergej-abashin-v-rossii-migratsionnaya-politika-imeet-kha 
oticheskij-i-neposledovatelnyj-kharakter>
2 Svetlana Gannushkina, Grazhdanskoe sodeistvie, 14 May 2014. 
<http://refugee.ru/migratsionnoj-politiki-v-rossii-net/>
3 Vladimir S. Malakhov, “Russia as a new immigration country: 
Policy response and public debate,” Europe Asia Studies 66, 7 
(September) 2014, pp. 1062–79.
4 <http://www.fms.gov.ru/documentation/koncep_mig_pol/>
5 <http://www.raspp.ru/about/docs/tematicheskie_dokumenty/
koncepciya_gosudarstvennoj_migracionnoj_politiki_rossijskoj_
federacii_proekt/>
Anti-Migrant Rhetoric and Ethnoracial 
Profiling of Migrants
The campaign for Moscow’s mayoral elections in 2013 
unleashed a most virulent rhetoric against migrants, tar-
geted largely at Central Asian migrants who constitute 
nearly 60–65% of the workforce in Moscow and other 
major cities in Russia. They tend to be less educated and 
lack proficiency in Russian, which turns them into the 
most convenient targets of ethnoracial profiling, sub-
jected to frequent document checks, fines, detentions 
and deportations. They face the greatest pressures to 
prove their legality in a legal framework and political 
economy which thrive on an illegalization of migrants.
In a climate where rule of law does not operate, and 
the media and several public figures flag anti-migrant, 
particularly anti-Muslim rhetoric, it is the police and 
the officials who claim the prerogative of defining who 
is legal, and what constitutes a violation of the migration 
law. Judged by the anti-migrant rhetoric and propaganda 
which unifies the officials, media and ordinary people 
and anti-migrant bias of various laws and bureaucratic 
procedures, Russia, and Moscow in particular, may be 
one of the most inhospitable and even dangerous places 
for migrants in Europe. Central Asian migrants are also 
the most lucrative source of revenues and extortions for 
the police and Federal Migration Service (FMS) officials.
In response to the widespread campaigns to limit the 
number of migrants, introduce visa regime for migrants 
from Central Asia, and the disinformation about high 
levels of criminality among them, FMS has intensified 
a crackdown against “illegal migration.” It issued depor-
tation orders for 65,000 foreigners in 2013 and barred 
another 500,000 from entering Russia for a period of 
3 years. By October 2014, a total of almost a million 
migrants have been barred entry into Russia for 3 years 
for alleged “criminal” activities, most of which pertain 
to the violation of rules pertaining to their legal status in 
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the country or for committing more than two “admin-
istrative violations” (often of petty nature such as vio-
lating traffic rules or public misdemeanors) over a three 
year period. About 40% of these are from Uzbekistan 
and 20% from Tajikistan.6
Understanding “Illegal” Migration
Konstantin Romodanovsky, the Chairman of FMS, 
noted with pride that the various measures adopted 
in the current year are reducing “mass migration from 
Central Asia” and “effectively deter illegal labor migra-
tion and illegal labour activity.”7
It is questionable whether the number of migrants 
from Central Asia has decreased or whether the deporta-
tions and entry bans have reduced “illegal” labor migra-
tion. Most deportations and entry bans have no legal 
basis and do not allow migrants a right to appeal. In 
reality, most deportation orders are not carried out, and 
many migrants remain in Russia without valid docu-
ments, thus increasing the share of “illegal” migrants 
in the labor market and the society. Some of these are 
able to muster resources to buy new passports on the 
basis of a new identity from the numerous “legalizing” 
firms operating in Russia. a number of Uzbek citizens 
without valid documents were able to buy Tajik pass-
ports through one of such firms. Similarly, a large num-
ber of those issued entry bans opt to remain in Russia 
as long as they are able to avoid the gaze of the officials. 
Thus compiling and publicly releasing such statistics 
on deportations and entry bans is more a case of show 
of strength by the FMS and law enforcement officials 
to prove that they are efficiently executing policies and 
also to assure the anti-migrant attitudes rampant in 
the media and among ordinary people that migration 
is being kept “under control.”
What precisely is illegal migration? How do migrants 
become “illegal”? a more pertinent question is: how can 
a Central Asian migrant, who enters Russia legally under 
the visa-free regime and is authorized to remain up to 
90 days after registering at the place of entry within 
seven days of arrival, become “illegal”? Given the high 
demand for “cheap and readily available” migrant labor 
in numerous sectors of the economy, why is it so diffi-
cult for migrants to obtain legal employment and main-
tain a legal status in Russia?
Russia’s complex laws and elaborate procedures gov-
erning the status of migrant workers on the one hand 
and the lack of a mechanism of their effective imple-
6 RIA novosti, 17 January 2014. <http://www.themoscowtimes.
com/news/article/65000-foreigners-deported-from-russia-
in-2013/492843.html>
7 “Glava FMS: pochti 1 million instrantsev zakryt v’ezd v Rossiiu,” 
23 September 2014. <http://itar-tass.com/obschestvo/1460698>
mentation on the other make it nerve-wracking for a for-
eigner to obtain the necessary documentation such as 
registration, labor patent, work permit or residency sta-
tus by following the specified legal procedure. In order 
to procure the documents needed to live and work legally 
in Russia, migrants are forced to approach the numer-
ous “intermediaries” (posredniki) who control access to 
information and to officials who can “get things done.” 
The intermediaries can be a broad range of people: law-
yers, migrants’ associations, diaspora activists, legal and 
commercial firms offering a variety of documentation 
and “legalization” services, and individual fixers. These 
intermediaries and officials within the state administra-
tion, migration services, police, and security services are 
closely interlinked and form mutually profitable busi-
ness arrangements by ensuring that migrants (and also 
Russian citizens) cannot obtain the necessary docu-
ments on their own by following the normal procedure.
Thus the process of becoming “legal” forces a migrant 
to enter into a variety of semi-legal or outright illegal 
(“corrupt”) transactions with intermediaries and offi-
cials. It is impossible to obtain the necessary documen-
tation without resorting to quasi-legal or corrupt prac-
tices. This suggests that while the media and public 
opinion remains obsessed with the “threats” posed by 
“illegal migrants”, the anti-migrant attitudes and the 
spectre of “illegal migration” generate very lucrative 
business for the various officials and intermediaries and 
also allows the police and law enforcement officials to 
target migrants for extortions.
Obtaining Documentation to Become Legal
Here is a basic list of documents that a migrant enter-
ing Russia under the CIS visa-free system requires in 
order to live and work legally: a temporary registration 
at the place of arrival (registratsiia po mestu pribyvaniia) 
within 7 days of entry, labor patent which authorizes 
migrants to work for up to one year for an individual 
(but not for a commercial firm), health certificate and 
copies of fingerprints required for getting the patents, 
work permits (for being employed by a commercial firm 
which has secured the quota to hire foreign workers), and 
a certificate of proficiency in Russian needed for a speci-
fied list of jobs. Those applying for permanent residency 
(also granted on the basis of quotas set annually by the 
FMS), long-term settlement, asylum, refugee status, cit-
izenship and so on also have to go through a bureau-
cratic maze which is very challenging to navigate with-
out paying intermediaries.
Obtaining Legal Work: Patents and Quotas
There are basically two ways whereby a migrant from the 
CIS region can work legally in Russia: buy a labor patent 
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which allows them to work only for a household or an 
individual entity (chastnoe litso) or work for a company 
or business which has the authorization to hire foreign 
workers within the quota allocated by the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Protection. But do these two docu-
ments really allow migrants to become legal?
Buying a Labor Patent
Russia introduced the labor patent in July 2010 which 
allows migrants arriving under the CIS visa free regime 
to obtain legal employment without having to depend 
on the employer for registration and legal status which 
had reduced them to the status of bonded laborers ear-
lier. Another aim of the patent was to enable the state 
to earn revenues by drawing migrants from the infor-
mal economy into the official one.
Migrants can directly obtain a patent by registering 
at the local FMS office after supplying a copy of work 
contract with the employer (though this requirement 
is often not enforced) and making a payment of 1216 
rubles a month (up from 1000 a month or equivalent to 
$30 when it was introduced) or the corresponding pay-
ment for a quarter. Patent is initially given for a maxi-
mum of 3 months and can be renewed every month or 
three months depending on whether one is willing to 
pay for a month or for 3 months and is valid for up to 1 
year. It cannot be renewed but the same migrant worker 
can buy a new patent. The patent only allows migrants to 
be employed with an individual entity (fizicheskoe litso) 
and not for a legal one (yuridicheskoe litso). a package 
of measures for introducing a more complex and varie-
gated patent—allowing skilled migrants as well as for-
eign students to obtain employment with commercial 
firms albeit for a fee of up to 3000 rubles a month—is 
being debated in the Duma but it is doubtful if it will 
be passed and if it will constitute a “reform” of the exist-
ing system.
In theory migrants can obtain the patent on their 
own by following what is described as a simple legal pro-
cedure, but in reality the entire system pushes them to 
rely on intermediaries. Those desiring to obtain a patent 
on their own encounter hurdles at every step. The very 
first hurdle is obtaining a token to hold a place in the 
queue for acquiring the necessary application materials. 
Many migrants reported the presence of “tough Cauca-
sians (kavkaztsy)” who stand as gatekeepers and control 
access to the token-dispensing machines and offer the 
desired place in the queue for a price. There is a deliberate 
ambiguity on whether the patent is to be filled by hand 
or typed and FMS officials frequently return the appli-
cations to migrants by pointing to petty mistakes and 
demand them to submit a new application. They often 
direct migrants to firms located nearby which “help” 
them with filling out the forms: needless to say, the offi-
cials have a stake in the revenues earned by such firms.
A person seeking to do all documentation on his own 
can spend several days in obtaining the application form, 
proof of registration and a copy of fingerprints. Appli-
cants have to form a separate queue for having their fin-
ger-prints taken and for collecting the certificate. “There 
are a total of 38 finger-printing scanners all over Mos-
cow and many of them do work efficiently all the time,” 
informed a migrants’ rights activist in late 2013. A pay-
ment of about 500 rubles to intermediaries facilitates 
a fast-track access for having fingerprints taken. Ready-
made fingerprint copies are available through interme-
diaries for about 2000 rubles.
The price of a patent obtained through intermedi-
aries ranges from 3500 to 6000 rubles: an established 
legal firm “Z” charges 4500 per patent, whereas some 
others firms may charge around 6000. “Sultan,” a Tajik 
Figure 1: Advertisement posted by an apparent Tajik or 
Uzbek firm offering “official registration” for citizens of 
the CIS and Russian Federation. There is a grammatical 
mistake: the word “ofitsial’naya” should have been used 
instead of “ofitsial’noe” indicating that the firm is run by 
migrants with limited knowledge of Russian (the text on 
the poster translates as follows: “Official registration / For 
citizens of CIS and RF / Labor permit / Patent / Health 
certificates;” the text above at the top of the tags with the 
telephone number reads “All documents.”).
Photo: Bhavna Davé
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intermediary with a thriving business of offering regis-
trations, patents and work quotas charges 3500 to those 
who come through known channels and 4000 to others.
From August 2014 migrants arriving in Russia 
in order to obtain a patent are required to write their 
intention to work on the migration card upon entering 
the country. They cannot obtain a patent otherwise. 
Often the border officials fill out the migration cards for 
migrants, frequently writing the purpose of visit as “per-
sonal”, making mistakes or often “Russianizing” their 
names without the knowledge of the migrants. Rahmon 
from Tajikistan found his name spelled as Roman by 
the border official and had to pay 500 rubles to correct 
the spelling mistakes made on the card. He was told to 
go to Domodedovo airport which was the only place 
where such corrections could be made.
Although the patent was introduced to aid a legal-
ization of migrant workers and reduce informal and ille-
gal employment, it has had no visible impact on reduc-
ing the number of migrants employed informally, i.e., 
“illegally”. About 1.8 million migrants were working on 
patents in early 2014 and the number is likely to have 
exceeded 2 million by the end of the current year as 
many migrants are using the patent as a means of stay-
ing legal while they informally work in other jobs which 
pay a higher salary. Patent holders usually earn far less 
as wages earned as a domestic or household worker tend 
to be lower than in other sectors such as construction, 
cleaning, catering etc., where many migrants work infor-
mally without a work permit or labor contract.
About 40% of patent holders are from Uzbekistan, 
20% from Tajikistan, and 15% from Kyrgyzstan. The 
remaining are from Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and 
Armenia. As members of the CIS Customs Union cit-
izens of Kazakhstan and Belarus have a privileged sta-
tus in Russia’s labor market. As citizens of Georgia need 
a visa, they are not eligible for patents but can instead 
obtain a work visa.
Quotas for Work Permits
In practice, it is very difficult for ordinary Russian 
employers to get the permission and the required num-
ber of quotas to hire foreign workers as big business, 
agencies and individuals connected with the FMS secure 
open a number of fictive firms (as one firm can obtain 
no more than 100 quota) and obtain quotas for each of 
these. After buying quotas wholesale, these large firms 
sell them to smaller firms and individuals for a much 
higher price.
The mechanism of setting quotas for hiring foreign 
workers is very complex and time-consuming, and the 
allocation of quotas by the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Protection among various businesses is non-transparent. 
Rather than engaging in a proper consultation with busi-
ness, employers, and experts—within Russia as well as in 
the migrant-sending states—the officials set the quotas 
which do not correspond to the logic of the labor mar-
ket. As one migration scholar mentioned, “the numbers 
are taken from the lamp-post” (‘tsifry berut ot fonarya’), 
emphasizing the lack of congruence between the quota 
system and the demand for labor in various sectors of 
the economy. FMS officials have time to time proposed 
annulment of quotas and a package of amendments to 
the quota system are being debated in lawmaking circles. 
However, many of these pronouncements are declara-
tory and there is no clear indication as yet of significant 
reforms to the quota system or concrete proposals for 
scrapping the system.
In order to obtain permissions under the quotas for 
hiring foreign workers, employers or firms have to file 
an application (podat’ zayavku) between 1 November to 
1 May for the following year (thus one filing for quo-
tas for 2015 would have filed the application between 1 
November 2013 to 1 May 2014).
The practice so far shows that several large firms and 
influential intermediaries are able to obtain a bulk of 
quotas. As large firms buy quotas wholesale, a sizable 
number of work places for which quota was secured 
actually remain unfilled. Moscow was allocated 155,000 
work permits for 2013 of which only 70,000 were dis-
tributed among various firms and little information on 
the remaining ones was available. In 2014 about 110,000 
work permits issued. An Uzbek migration lawyer who 
has his private law firm explained: “What this means is 
that the various posredniki with close connections with 
the administration on labour and employment in the 
Ministry of Labor would avail of the remaining 85,000 
in order to resell them for profit.”
The rules and practice of distribution of quotas dis-
advantage small employers and smaller legal firms as 
the FMS prefers to deal with “its own preferred firms,” 
added Ibragim. He explained that FMS officials fre-
quently find petty faults with application forms sub-
mitted by smaller firms, thus making them re-submit 
the paperwork which causes further delays and some of 
these firms simply run out of time to submit the forms 
by the deadline. While the preferred firms already have 
the insiders’ advantage in knowing how the forms are 
to be filled out.
Those who are able to obtain temporary residency 
(razreshenie na vremennoe prozhivanie) granted by the 
FMS for a period of up to 3 years or work permit have 
to undergo a mandatory health check by undergoing 
the specified tests. It costs about 1500 rubles and half 
a day to get these tests done at a clinic whereas about 
1000–1200 rubles to obtain the health certificate from 
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intermediaries. Migrants who are granted a work per-
mit now have to pass a Russian language test and also 
exams on knowledge of Russian language, history, cul-
ture and legal system from 1 January 2015. While it 
costs 5200 rubles to take a Russian language proficiency 
test, a language proficiency certificate can be obtained 
for 3500 or even for 2800 rubles if bought wholesale (at 
least 100 certificates).
Commercial firms or enterprises can hire migrant 
workers only if they have obtained the relevant num-
ber of work permits and the requisite quota for foreign 
workers. About 70% of migrants work for commercial 
firms and only about 10% of these are working under 
the work quotas (kvoty na razreshenie na rabotu), which 
means that the remaining are working “illegally”.
Working Informally: a Quasi-Legal Status
Until December 2013 it was possible for migrants to 
cross the border (many went to Ukraine or Belarus, the 
nearest borders) and re-enter with a new migration card, 
which allowed them a new 90 day term. a new law which 
came into force from January 2014 allows foreigners 
to remain in Russia for only 90 days in one 180 days 
period, which means that they can re-enter Russia only 
after 90 days. The law is geared at limiting the number 
of migrants by stopping the practice of circular or shut-
tle migration which has allowed them to obtain unau-
thorized employment. It is also motivated by the perva-
sive perception that there are “too many” migrants and 
that most of them are working “illegally”, and pushing 
out Russian citizens from jobs due to their willingness 
to work for considerably lowered wages without any legal 
contract—a situation that suits most employers too well.
Even if the new restrictions reduce the number of 
migrants coming to Russia to work—which is doubt-
ful—they are pushing more migrants into an “illegal” 
or quasi-legal status. Migrants who are already work-
ing in Russia have 3 options after the completion of the 
90 day limit: (1) return home and wait for 90 days before 
they are eligible to return to Russia, which will deprive 
them of earnings; (2) try to work elsewhere in the CIS 
(Kazakhstan the most likely destination, but the wages 
are smaller) and then return to Russia; (3) buy a pat-
ent which will allow them to remain in Russia for up to 
a year but without working for an individual employer. 
And the fourth option is to just remain “illegally” in Rus-
sia and negotiate their illegality through bribes.
Conclusions
The labyrinth of Russia’s laws and bureaucratic proce-
dures is not easy for even educated and informed Rus-
sian citizens to negotiate. Most migrants are not well-
educated, do not speak Russian and do not have a good 
understanding of the prevalent rules and regulations. To 
go directly to FMS or the relevant authorities for doc-
umentation without help of brokers or intermediaries 
means encountering obstacles and delays at every stage. 
It is more efficient and economical to make a one off pay-
ment to an intermediary or a legal firm than to attempt 
to handle all documentation oneself.
In this climate, the distinction between “legal” and 
“illegal” migration is becoming increasingly arbitrary 
and untenable from a legal, normative and practical 
standpoint. However, officials and various government 
functionaries continue to exploit the arbitrary divide 
between the two.
Thus the numerous laws and shadow economy which 
have emerged to aid a “legalization” of migrants now 
thrive on keeping a sizable proportion of migrants in 
a quasi-legal status, continuously facing the threat of 
criminalization, illegalization and deportations.
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Figure 2: Participants in the Russian March in Moscow on November 4, 2014 (on the official holiday of “national unity”) 
display various crude and primitive anti-migrant banners. This one says “Moscow does not believe in guests,” a word play 
on a famous movie title (the black-yellow-white flag was the official national flag of the Russian Empire from 1858 to 1883 
and is currently associated with Russian nationalists and monarchists). 
Photo: Bhavna Davé
Figure 3: This placard advocates introducing a visa regime for Central Asians, whose faces are caricatured (the text on the 
chest of the ‘ dragon’ or ‘ hydra’ reads “ illegal migration”, the text on the red diagonal bar translates as “say yes to visas!”). 
Photo: Bhavna Davé
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Figure 4: This placard advocates entry bans for central Asians who are represented by brooms, rakes, and shovels, suggest-
ing that they lack the humanity of other people (the text on the right-hand side of the placard translates as follows: “nobody 
is needed—get yourselves gone without a trace! We hate the ‘usefulness’ of your labor / Stas Duyev, Russian poet”; the text 
across the figures on the left-hand side translates as “refuse [them] entry!”).
Photo: Bhavna Davé
